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We review the modern history of financial crises, providing a context for analyses of the world’s recent
bout of financial instability. Along with indicators of economic performance in the subject countries,
we present a comprehensive description of multilateral rescue efforts spanning the last 30 years. We
show that while emergency lending has grown, reliance on debt restructuring has declined. This leads
us to ask what can be done to rebalance the management of debt problems toward a better mix of emergency
lending and private sector burden sharing. Building on the literature on collective action clauses, we
explore the idea of sovereign cocos, contingent debt securities that automatically reduce payment obligations
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the three decades ending in 1980, serious crises implicating financial systems and 
sovereign creditworthiness were few.
2  Since then, however, crises have proliferated. The 
debt crisis of the 1980s, centering on syndicated bank loans, engulfed a large number of 
Latin-American countries, most prominently Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, but extended 
also to Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe.
3  The Tequila crisis of 1994-95 affecting Mexico 
and Argentina was the first since the 1930s to center on international bond markets.
4  The 
Asian crisis in 1997-98, felt most acutely in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and 
Philippines but with wider repercussions, brought to the fore other international financial 
contracts, including currency forwards and futures and interbank credits.
5  The crisis in 
Russia and the succeeding events spanning the period 1998-2002 threatened financial 
stability in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Turkey.  Finally, the most recent set of crises—in 
Ukraine, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Romania, Greece, Ireland and Portugal—highlights even 
more prominently than before the connections between financial-sector and sovereign-credit 
risks. 
 
Just as the frequency and nature of crises have changed, so have multilateral rescue 
efforts.
6  The IMF has been at the center of the multilateral response, although the role of 
other official bilateral and multilateral lenders has grown over time. The number of IMF-
supported programs (“IMF programs” or “programs”) has been predictably bunched: up in 
the early 1980s, up again in the mid -1990s, up more modestly around 2000, and up again 
starting in 2008 (see Figure 1, left panel).  IMF credit in billions of U.S. dollars shows a 
similar bunching superimposed on a rising trend (Figure 1, right panel).  As documented 
below, cofinancing from other official sources has further increased program financing 
                                                 
1 The authors are with the International Monetary Fund, the University of California, Berkeley, and the 
International Monetary Fund, respectively.  This paper was prepared for the NBER-Sloan project on the Global 
Financial Crisis. We thank Kristen Forbes for helpful comments and Ajai Chopra, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Lee 
Buchheit and several colleagues at the IMF for generous feedback. The standard disclaimer applies with special 
force: the views expressed are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s management 
or Board of Directors. 
2 For tabulations see Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).  
3 See Kahler (1986). 
4 An introduction to which can be found in Cline (1995). 
5 The literature on the Asian financial crisis is immense.  An early overview that shaped much of the subsequent 
literature is Goldstein (1998).  An accessible introduction to the subsequent controversies is Blustein (2003). 




7  IMF commitments since 2009 also include those granted under the Flexible 
Credit Line arrangements to Mexico, Poland, and Colombia, which are also substantial 
although less likely to be drawn, and a Precautionary Credit Line arrangement for Macedonia 
which was partly drawn in March 2011.
8  
 
  An extensive literature addresses these financial crises and multilateral rescue 
efforts.  One strand asks why crises have grown more frequent and disruptive.
9  Another asks 
whether IMF programs have helped with the restoration of macroeconomic stability or only 
aggravated output losses by requiring additional austerity of the borrower but without 
restoring investor and consumer confidence.  It asks, moreover, whether the international 
policy response, even when it provides immediate relief, contributes to the growing incidence 
of crises by creating moral hazard.
10  Encompassing these concerns is a broader debate on the 
appropriate balance between official financing, adjustment or austerity, and private sector 
burden sharing.   
 
 
Figure 1: IMF programs 1980-2011 (June) 
emerging and advanced economies 
 
 
The controversial nature of this literature reflects the difficulties these issues pose for 
measurement and analysis. Measurement of a country’s adjustment effort requires 
                                                 
7 Although this funding is projected to be drawn down only over time. 
8 A description of these new facilities is Goretti and Joshi (2010). 
9 See inter alia Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez Peria (2001). 
10 Some would argue that these moral hazard concerns are overdone, observing that equity investors among 
others incur serious losses in crises (e.g. Mussa 2002). Rogoff (2010, pp. 16-17) is representative of the 
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considerable judgment as to the country’s initial conditions.
11  For analysis of the effects of 
IMF programs, there is also the problem—most clearly evident in econometric treatments—
that both crises and programs have changed over time.  The structural relationship that the 
econometrician is seeking to estimate is not stable, in other words.
12  A related problem is 
that analyses attempting to determine how IMF programs affect the frequency, incidence and 
magnitude of crises often fail to acknowledge that programs are not randomly assigned.
13  
 
Some would argue that crises and the multilateral response are, in fact, not just 
coevolutionary but codependent: that they have developed a reactive pattern of coexistence 
and problem solving over time.
14  As countries have become more integrated into global 
financial markets, financial crises have become more intense and official financing has 
grown larger; and as programs have grown larger, the next set of crises has proved more 
virulent.  Some have argued that the availability of official finance from multilateral and 
national sources has rendered international investors more sanguine with the respect to the 
risks they assume.  In turn this has permitted countries to postpone necessary adjustments, 
rendering the latter more costly and difficult when they can no longer be delayed.  No one 
would question the desirability of more effective crisis prevention measures.  But at the same 
time there would be considerable value to creating a more stable and predictable framework 
for crisis resolution.
15   
 
This last issue will be familiar to followers of the crisis literature.  Commentators 
have been making the case for alternatives to emergency financial assistance for more than 
15 years.
16  Proposals for doing so range from abolishing the IMF in the extreme to placing 
new restrictions on its lending, creating a statutory mechanism for sovereign debt 
restructuring, and introducing restructuring-friendly collective action and representation 
clauses into bond contracts.
17  Still others would say that such institutional changes are 
unnecessary.  It is already possible, they argue, to restructure problem debts under current 
arrangements.  In this view, policy makers only need to better appreciate the case for this 
market-based alternative.
18 
                                                 
11 There are at least two facets of adjustment: correcting immediate macroeconomic imbalances with medium-
term structural considerations related to raising potential growth rates, and reducing financial sector 
vulnerability. A full assessment then requires tracking a program over time to assess how much of the initially-
proposed adjustment was actually undertaken. 
12  One can think of crises and rescues as locked in a process of coevolution—as two interdependent species 
each adapting to changes in the other.  One is reminded of how biologists have turned to game theory to model 
the evolution of competing species.  
13 And analyses that adopt clever econometric fixes—using the frequency with which a country votes with the 
United States in the UN General Assembly as an instrument for the likelihood of shareholder support for a 
program, for example—are less than convincing.  We ourselves (Eichengreen and Mody) have committed this 
sin on at least one occasion: see Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody (2006). 
14 The phrase after the colon is the Merriam Webster definition of codependence. 
15 For a critique of IMF surveillance in the run up the most recent crisis, see the report of the Fund’s Internal 
Evaluation Office (IEO 2011). 
16 An early statement, in a report to the G-10, was Eichengreen and Portes (1995).  The definitive summary of 
the first generation of literature on this question was Roubini and Setser (2004). 
17 For examples see Hanke (2000), Meltzer Commission (2000), Krueger (2001) and Eichengreen (2003). 




The challenge can be described as a problem of time consistency.  Once a crisis has 
broken out, the concern among decision makers is that private-sector burden sharing, while 
desirable in principle, risks further destabilizing an already volatile situation; hence they 
draw back from their original insistence on burden sharing. Such time inconsistency is 
understandable, but if not addressed could result in an unmanageable problem of ever larger 
crises leading to ever larger official financing.  
 
In this paper we describe once again the state of play, providing a broader context for 
the other papers at this conference focusing on the most recent crisis.  Along with indicators 
of economic performance in the crisis countries, we present a comprehensive description of 
major multilateral rescue efforts spanning the last 30 years.
19  We employ analytic narrative 
rather than econometrics.
20  Not only do the connections between financial circumstances and 
policy responses run both ways, but those connections are complex and evolve over time, as 
emphasized above.  The Lucas Critique applies with a vengeance, in other words.  And even 
true believers in econometric modeling will acknowledge that the first step toward a proper 
structural analysis is careful data construction and description.
21 
 
We start in Section 2 by painting the picture of crisis incidence and response.  We 
identify crisis dates on the basis of the behavior of exchange rates and sovereign spreads.  
We provide preliminary comparisons across episodes of causes, consequences and correlates 
as a way of introducing non-specialist readers to the lay of the land and reminding specialists 
of the terrain.   
 
Section 3 considers the multilateral response, focusing on the size of official rescue 
packages.  We marshal data on cofinancing to analyze changes in the shares of multilateral 
and bilateral contributions over time and to more accurately gauge the magnitude of 
assistance.  The resulting picture is one of official financial assistance packages that are 
growing larger over time.  Section 4 complements this picture by showing that while 
emergency lending has grown, debt restructuring has become less frequent, and is being used 
only as a last resort, as in the case of Greece.
22   
 
We ask in Section 5 what can be done to rebalance the management of debt problems 
toward a better mix of emergency lending and private sector burden sharing.  Building on the 
literature on collective action clauses, we explore the idea of “sovereign cocos,” contingent 
debt securities that automatically reduce payment obligations in the event of debt-
sustainability problems.  As with all such ideas, the devil is in the details.  We would be the 
                                                 
19 Thus, we do not consider programs for low-income countries and countries that were not viewed as of 
broader relevance during the key crisis episodes. 
20 On analytic narrative as a research methodology see Bates et al. (1998) and Rodrik (2007). 
21 And since the data and experience we consider cover an extended period, we are able to use historical events 
as predetermined variables that drive the dynamics of the system over time—that provide the identifying 
variation. 
22 See Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2007) for similar conclusions. 5 
 
 
first to acknowledge that we don’t have all the details worked out.  But we offer our thoughts 
if only to provoke discussion. 
 
 
II.   CRISIS EPISODES 
We distinguish five major clusters of crises: the Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980s (what is sometimes called the commercial debt crisis in honor of the commercial banks 
that engaged in much of the international financial intermediation of the preceding period); 
the Tequila Crisis of the mid-1990s; the Asian financial crisis of 1997; the Russian crisis of 
1998 and the emerging market crises that occurred in its wake; and the crisis in emerging and 
advanced economies in Europe that erupted in the wake of the subprime mortgage debacle.  
In the case of the Tequila crisis we consider not just Mexico but also Argentina.   In the case 
of Asia we include Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and the Philippines, all of which had 
IMF-supported programs.  In the case of what we refer to as the Russian crisis we consider 
not just Russia but also other countries that experienced sharp increases in currency volatility 
and sovereign spreads in the months and years following Russia’s default: Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Turkey.  In the case of the post-subprime crisis we consider not just Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal but also Ukraine, Iceland, Hungary, Latvia and Romania; we consider 
more than just the euro crisis, per se, in other words. 
 
We consider only crisis countries that ultimately were in an IMF-supported program. 
Presumably, no program is also a multilateral response.
23 In general, however, the more 
severe a crisis, the greater is the likelihood of a program.
24  
 
Any taxonomy of crisis episodes is controversial.  A case in point is our grouping the 
Russian crisis with subsequent crises in Latin America and Turkey.  While this is defensible 
on chronological grounds, it may be not as defensible analytically, as the Russian crisis is 
often seen as sui generis.
25  Fortunately, most distinctions we highlight in this section carry 
over when we drop this one observation from our fourth cluster.   
 
We identify crises using data on currency market turbulence and sovereign spreads.  
In the manner of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), currency market turbulence is 
measured by a weighted average of the rate of change of the exchange rate change and the 
                                                 
23 No doubt there are lessons from Brazil during the Tequila crisis and Malaysia during the Asian crisis, as these 
countries undertook their own significant adjustment so as to render multilateral support unnecessary. 
24 Thus, we put aside the 1992-3 EMS (European Monetary System) episode on the grounds that none of the 
affected countries faced the same crisis severity as the episodes we do study, and, as such, did not require IMF 
or other official financing and none were forced to restructure their debts.   In fact this sixth cluster shares some 
features in common with our five episodes, but not others.  Using our measure of exchange market pressure, 
Italy, the UK, Sweden, Finland and Norway had currency crises, but in no case do sovereign spreads rise to the 
threshold we use to distinguish sovereign debt crises.  In addition, drops in output and rises in government 
deficit and debt ratios were smaller than in our other five clusters.  There were capital inflows in the run-up to 
the crisis (this being one of the telltale signs of impending crisis that we distinguish below), but looking at the 
financial account exclusive of reserves we do not see inflows on the same scale observed in the other episodes.    
25 See Gilman (2010).  We return to this point below. 6 
 
 
rate of change of reserves, where the two components are weighted by their respective 
standard deviations.
26  Values of the index at least three standard deviations above the mean 
are identified as crises.  In addition, in the manner of Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2006) we 
pinpoint crises on the basis of sovereign spreads; here spreads that are at least one standard 
deviation above the mean are identified as crises.






                                                 
26 We also considered the rate of change of the reserve/GDP ratio in lieu of the rate of change of reserves; 
nothing of substance changes with this substitution. 
27 For the commercial debt crisis, crises and peaks of sovereign spreads are based on Edwards (1986) and 
Folkerts-Landau (1985). 7 
 
 
Table 1: Timing and peak of crisis, and IMF-supported programs 
    Timing of crisis    Peak of crisis    IMF program 








  Date  
(augmentation) 
IMF commitment 
(percent of GDP) 
Commercial debt crisis 
Mexico   Feb.  82  Aug.82   Dec. 82      Jan.83 – Dec.85 
Nov.86 – Apr.88 
May.89 – May.93(Jan.90/May.92) 
5.2 
Argentina   Dec.83 
Apr.89 
Sep.82   Dec.83 
Apr.89 
    Jan.83 – Jan.84 
Dec.84 – Jun. 86 
Jul.87 – Sep.88 
Nov.89 – Mar.91 
Jul.91– Mar.92 
5.4 
Brazil   Jan.90  Aug.82   Feb.90      Mar.83 – Feb.86 
Aug.88 – Feb.90 
Jan.92 – Aug.93 
3.7 
Tequila crisis 
Mexico   Dec.94  Jan,95   Dec.  94  Mar.95    Feb.95 – Feb.97  5.5 
Argentina     Jan.95   Mar.95  Feb.95    Mar.92 – Mar.96(Dec. 92/Apr.95) 




Thailand   Jul.97  Nov.97   Jan.  98  Sep.98    Aug.97 – Jun.00  2.6 
Indonesia   Dec.97     Jan.  98      Nov.97 – Aug.98 (Jul.98) 
Aug.98 – Feb.00 (Mar.99) 
4.8 
Korea   Nov.97  Dec.97   Dec.  97  Sep.98    Dec.97 – Dec.00  4.0 
Philippines  Dec.97  Aug.98   Dec.  97  Sep.98    Jun.94 – Mar.98 (Jul.97) 
Apr.98 – Dec.00 
3.8 
Russian crisis and aftermath 
Russia   Aug.98  Sep.98   Sep.98  Mar.99    Mar.96 – Mar.99  (Jul-98) 
Jul.99 – Dec.00 
7.2 
Brazil   Jan.99  Oct.01   Jan.99  Oct.02    Dec.98 – Sep.01  
Sep.01 – Sep.02 
Sep.02 – Mar.05 (Dec.03) 
11.6 
Argentina     Dec.01   May.02 Jul.02    Feb.98-Mar.00 
Mar.00 – Jan.03 (Jan./Sep.01) 
Jan.03 – Aug.03 
Sep.03 – Jan.06 
20.9 
Uruguay   Jul.02  Jul.02   Jul.02  Oct.02    Apr.02 – Mar.05(Jun./Aug.02) 
Jun.05 – Dec.06 
25.7 
Turkey   Feb.01  Dec.00   Feb.01  Jul.01    Dec.99 – Feb.02(Dec.00./May.01) 
Feb.02 – Feb.05 
May.05 – May.08 
17.4 
European crisis 
Ukraine     Oct.08   Oct.08  Mar.09    Nov.08 – Jul.10 
Jul.10 – Dec.12 
20.8 
Hungary   Oct.08  Oct.08   Jan.09  Apr.09    Nov.08 – Oct.10  10.6 
Iceland   Sep.08  Oct.08   Sep.08  Dec.08    Nov.08 – Aug.11  13.1 
Latvia   Oct.08  Oct.08   Oct.08  Mar.09    Dec.08 – Dec.11  7.1 
Romania     Oct.08   Jan.09  Feb.09    May.09 – Mar.11 
Mar.11 – Mar.13  
13.6 
Greece   Oct.08  Apr.10   Oct.08  Jul.11   May.10  –  May.13  13.2 
Ireland   Oct.  08  Sep.10   Jan.09  Jul. 11    Dec.10 – Dec.13  14.5 








Table 1 shows the resulting crisis dates, the timing of the first IMF intervention, the 
number of IMF-supported programs associated with the episode, and the cumulative IMF 
financial commitment.  Several differences across episodes are notable.
28  For example, the 
debt crisis of the 1980s displays an especially large increase in exchange market pressure, 
reflecting high rates of inflation in the crisis countries. Sovereign spreads, on the other hand, 
rose more modestly in that episode, in part because much of the debt in question was 
borrowing from commercial bank syndicates.
29   
 
Risk premia on sovereign bonds came to the fore in the Tequila crisis, when Mexican 
spreads rose by 1,500 basis points. For Mexico, the crisis was resolved with a single 
program; but program size was substantially larger than in the 1980s. In contrast, private 
sector imbalances were the proximate source of the Asian crisis, with sovereign spreads 
rising only with subsequent worries that governments would socialize the losses of banks and 
large corporations.    
 
Exchange market pressure then rose sharply with the Russian crisis, albeit to lower 
levels than in the commercial debt crisis.  Some countries obtained multiple IMF-supported 
programs, raising cumulative average program financing size considerably above levels 
reached in prior crises episodes.  
 
Finally, exchange market pressure has been no greater in the recent European crisis 
than in preceding ones.  (In the case of the three euro zone economies, of course, this index 
has limited significance, since they are small parts of the euro area economically and their 
difficulties thus have only limited impact on the euro exchange rate.)  Spreads on sovereign 
bonds are high by historical standards for Greece and are high everywhere by the prior 
standards of the countries themselves. Those spreads reflect limited access to international 
capital markets, a reduction notable because of the particularly easy access prior to the crisis.  
 
In three episodes (the 1980s, Asian, and current crises), GDP growth had been 
unsustainably high for some time before the crisis.  But growth had begun to decelerate 
before the crisis crystallized in the 1980s and in Asia (Figure 2, left panel).
 30  The Tequila 
and Russian crises, in contrast, were preceded by slow growth despite the exceptional 
measures taken in Mexico to sustain growth in 1994, a presidential election year.
31  More 
often than not, it would appear, weakening growth due to accumulated macroeconomic 
imbalances is a precursor to crises.  In the commercial debt crisis, the existence of 
imbalances was evident in the acceleration in inflation during the run-up (Figure 2, right 
panel).  Of our subsequent crises, in contrast, significant inflation was evident only in the 
run-up to the Russian crisis.
32 
                                                 
28 There have been some similar comparisons before (see e.g. Reinhart, Goldstein and Kaminsky 2000, Sheng 
2009 and Claessens et al. 2011 for illustrations of alternative approaches).  Our analysis is differs in its focus on 
as many as five separate episodes and in the countries considered.   
29 The commercial debt was only extensively securitized starting in 1989. 
30 t denotes the year of the currency or sovereign crisis, whichever occurs first.  
31 As emphasized in Gil-Diaz (1998). 





  Figure 2: Growth and inflation  
 
 
The behavior of public debt and deficits also differs across episodes (Figure 3).
33  
Consistent with the contrasting behavior of inflation noted above, lax public finances played 
a major role in Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s and in the countries 
experiencing difficulties in the wake of Russia’s default.  But the same was not true in Asia 
or Latin America in the 1990s.  Some argue that Mexico in 1994 had public spending hidden 
in the accounts of its development bank and that governments of the Asian crisis countries 
had significant implicit liabilities to banks and industrial conglomerates that did not show up 
in the budgetary accounts.
34  But the comparative statement remains valid: public sector 
deficits were more of a problem in the run-up to the 1980s and Russian debt crises, while 
private sector deficits were more of a problem in the run-up to the Tequila and Asian crises.   
 
Interpreting the state of European public finances is particularly challenging.
35 With 
the exception of Greece, the state of the public finances did not obviously indicate a looming 
crisis. Assessments prior to the crisis also showed low “structural” deficits because potential 
growth rates were regarded as high and hence the cyclical component of the growth was not 
seen as large. As shown in Figure 3, the dramatic deterioration of European budget balances 
following the onset of the crisis then led to significant reassessment of the pre-crisis state of 
                                                 
33 Ideally one would want to include cyclically adjusted deficits as a measure of the pre-crisis fiscal stance and 
post-crisis response.  But estimates of cyclically adjusted deficits exist for only a very small subset of our crisis 
countries.  Moreover, there is considerable dispute about how the cycle affected the deficit (and therefore about 
how to do the cyclical adjustment), as we describe in the paragraph following this one. 
34 For discussion see GAO (1996). 
35 The general government deficit is greatly affected by the 2010 budget deficit in Ireland, which due to banking 
sector outlays that reached more than 32 percent of GDP. Excluding Ireland, the deterioration is still substantial, 
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public finances. Potential growth rates during the pre-crisis period were revised downward. 
Key revenue sources—notably those related to real-estate transactions—were belatedly 
acknowledged to have been temporary.
36  With benefit of hindsight it is now clear that 
unsustainable consumption booms and housing bubbles contributed to the appearance of 
healthy public finances while hiding sizeable structural deficits. Together with the failure to 
provision for implicit liabilities to the banking system, this meant that the strength of 
European budgets prior to 2008 was overstated.    
 
  Figure 3: Public finances  
 
 
External positions also varied widely across episodes. Current account deficits in the 
run-up to the current crisis were unusually large, but sizeable deficits were also present in all 
instances except the Russian crisis (Figure 4).  There is an apparent tendency for current 
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accounts to strengthen already in the period immediately preceding the crisis.
37  This 
presumably reflects the declining availability of private external finance and capital flight as 
problems began to become evident.  There is also a tendency for real exchange rates to 
appreciate (it is tempting to say “to become overvalued”) prior to crises and to collapse 
subsequently; the Russian and current crises stand out for the unusually early and late dates 
of their real rate collapses, respectively.  Reserve coverage measured as a share of short-term 
debt shows a tendency to decline in the run-up and to recover subsequently, with countries in 
the Russian crisis starting in a relatively secure position but seeing their coverage ratios then 
deteriorate particularly rapidly.   
 
These external imbalances were largest in the run-up to the recent European crisis. 
The presumption was that monetary integration would guarantee stability and facilitate catch-
up growth, which led to massive amounts of borrowing and lending by the private (primarily 
financial) sectors within Europe.
38 As in past crises, the European external imbalances 
narrowed mildly just prior to the crisis, as the impending problems become more evident and 
the availability of private external finance declined (in the Russian case, the current account 
had actually moved into a surplus before the onset of the crisis). Yet, even in the year before 
the crisis, the average current account deficit in the European crisis was 9 percent of GDP, 
matched by equivalent private capital inflows. In contrast, the size of the real exchange rates 
appreciation prior to European crisis was relatively moderate in the sense that it was no 
greater than in past crises (and smaller, in fact, relative to the commercial debt crisis).  
 
Leaving aside the Russian crisis, which saw a private capital outflow even before the 
event, the larger was the capital inflow prior to the crisis, the larger is the subsequent capital-
flow reversal. This phenomenon is also the distinguishing characteristic of the European 
crisis, where private capital inflows reached unprecedented heights and then collapsed with 
special ferocity.
39   Importantly, though, the accompanying decline in the real exchange rate 
during this crisis was significantly smaller and more gradual than in past crises. Similarly, the 
fall in reserve ratios in Europe was limited. 
 
  These comparisons point to important respects in which Europe’s crisis is different.   
Inflation was subdued before the crisis, reflecting the disciplines of the single currency in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, of a currency board in Latvia, and, more generally, a relatively 
widespread anchoring of inflation expectations.  The real exchange rate had gradually 
become overvalued but to a much lesser extent than may have been expected from the 
magnitude of the foreign capital inflows. Government budgets were closer to balance than in 
earlier crises, the exceptional case of Greece notwithstanding.  These are not unrelated 
observations: it was this very appearance of monetary and fiscal stability that allowed the 
now crisis countries to import capital in the amounts they did.   
 
                                                 
37 Actually moving into surplus in the Asian and Russian cases. 
38 See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002). For a critical ex post assessment of this process see Eichengreen (2010).  
Two earlier analyses that viewed these capital flows are relatively benign are Abiad, Mody, and Leigh (2009), 
Ahearne, Schmitz and von Hagen (2009), and Berger and Nitsch (2009). 
39 See also Section 3 below. 12 
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Instead, foreign capital inflows into European economies facilitated the buildup of a 
very high degree of leverage.  These countries’ serious internal imbalances had their roots in 
the resulting credit booms.  From around 2002, household credit grew significantly faster in 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and emerging European markets than in Germany and the other 
countries of the euro-area “core.”
40  Credit to non-financial corporations displayed a similar 
pattern.  The private sector borrowed from their banks, which in turn borrowed from banks 
elsewhere in Europe.
41  For Latvia and Romania, EU funds following accession in 2004 
contributed further to inflows. Despite rapid wage increases, household debt-to-income ratios 
rose in 2002-07 by more than five-times in Latvia, and by 270 percent in Hungary, 180 
percent in Ireland and 130 percent in Portugal. Housing prices rose dramatically in Greece, 
Ireland, Iceland, and Latvia.
42 Equity prices continued to rise right up to the eve of the crisis, 
in contrast to the situation in Asia some ten years before, when they started falling well 
before the crisis. 
 
The kind of fast recovery that followed the Asian crisis does not appear to be in the 
cards in Europe. The Asian crisis had a greater pure liquidity-crisis component: in Asia, the 
ratio of foreign exchange reserves to short-term debt had fallen to low levels, inviting 
speculative attacks on currencies; the subsequent build up in reserves was therefore sufficient 
to ease financial tensions. In Europe, in contrast, reserves were, on average, at healthier 
levels. More importantly, European crisis economies require a precipitous fall in domestic 
demand to achieve the necessary deleveraging. Without the option of exchange rate 
depreciation, this adjustment has had to rely largely on internal devaluation.
 43  
 
However, the rate of real depreciation following the crisis has been limited, as noted 
above. In the current episode, then, less post-crisis adjustment has taken the form of prices as 
opposed to quantities.  The greater difficulty of engineering a real depreciation has meant 
that it has been more difficult to substitute external for internal demand.  The implication is 
that absent growth and with continued deflationary tendencies, public debt ratios would be 
difficult to bring down. In this sense, the European crisis already resembles the more 
protracted commercial debt and Russian crises. That is to say, the current crop of post-crisis 
                                                 
40 Average annual growth rates of household credit over 2003-07 were: Ireland (23 percent), Greece 
(26 percent), Portugal (7 percent), compared to euro area (8 percent) and Germany (0.4 percent), based on ECB 
data. According to Eurostat, the annual growth rates of household credit were even higher in Hungary 
(27 percent) and Latvia (67 percent) during 2004-07, and Romania (88 percent) during 2005-07. 
41 In other words, banks in the problem countries funded their loans not just by taking deposits from residents 
but in addition by borrowing on the interbank wholesale money market. 
42 Unfortunately, comparable house price developments across this long span of time are not available. Even 
stock prices are available only from the Tequila crisis onwards. What data are available, however, point to clear 
difference between the Asian and European crises on the one hand and the Tequila and Russian crises on the 
other, as we are about to describe. 
43 Again, the exchange rate regime probably has a lot to do with this, it having been possible to unpeg pegged 
exchange rates in the wake of the Asian crisis but members of the euro area do not have such latitude. Also, the 
Asian crisis occurred in a period of high growth in much of the rest of the world, while the post-subprime crisis 
occurred in a period when trade and output were collapsing worldwide.  The scope for recovering by, inter alia, 
depreciating one’s currency and replacing domestic demand with external demand was, obviously, much greater 
in the former than the latter instance. 14 
 
 
recessions has been unusually severe by historical standards, and it is far from clear at the 
time of writing that this has run its course. 
 
Finally, there is the fact that some of these crises were global in scope while others 
were not.  For example, the Asian crisis occurred during a period of high growth in much of 
the rest of the world, while the post-subprime crisis occurred in a period when trade and 
output were collapsing worldwide.  Scope for recovering by, inter alia, depreciating one’s 
currency and replacing domestic demand with external demand was, obviously, much greater 
in the former than the latter instance. 
 
In sum, crises come in different flavors.  The Russian crisis of the late 1990s most 
closely resembles the debt crisis of the 1980s: weakness in domestic public finances was 
mirrored in inflationary trends, and both crises required large corrections of the real exchange 
rate.  The Asian and European crises also seem to have been cut from similar cloth.  Both 
heavily involved private-sector imbalances.  In both cases pre-crisis growth rested on the fast 
growth of credit and rapid rise of leverage.  Both saw large initial output drops, reflecting 
heavily compromised banking systems and the important roles played by pegged exchange 
rates or their monetary-union equivalent.  Given the existence of deep-rooted problems, it is 
likely that the European crisis will be persistent in the manner of the commercial debt and 
Russian crises. The Tequila episode, in contrast, stands alone.   
 
III.   THE SIZE OF FINANCING PACKAGES 
We now analyze trends in program financing.  Since we are interested not only in 
averages but also variations around them, we club the Tequila crisis (which led to only two 
programs) together with the Asian crisis. While, as discussed above, there are differences 
between the Tequila and Asian crises, for the purpose at hand—namely, the progression of 
program financing size—we would argue that they are part of the same evolutionary trend.  
That they occurred close together in time warrants treating them as a pair for present 
purposes. 
 
The magnitude of financing can be measured per program or by the cumulative sum 
of the financing through repeated programs during the course of a crisis episode. In addition, 
cofinancing with the IMF by official bilateral and multilateral creditors became increasingly 
important starting with the Tequila crisis.
44 Hence both IMF financing and the overall official 
financing are discussed below.   
 
The size of financing packages can also be normalized in different ways.  The 
country’s quota is the metric used in the IMF’s assessment of access levels.
45  But since 
                                                 
44 Official financing in this section does not include financing through debt rescheduling or restructuring. 
45 It is therefore the Fund’s practice to report the financing as a percent of the country’s quota. “Each member is 
assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative size in the world economy. A member’s quota determines its 
maximum financial commitment to the IMF, its voting power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF 
financing.” http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm.  The actual level of IMF access is based on the 
IMF’s policies on access limits and access under each facility or instrument.    15 
 
 
quotas have not always kept pace with global economic developments, we normalize 
program financing by the country’s nominal GDP.
46 Yet another alternative would be to 
deflate the dollar value of the program by an appropriate dollar price index.  Fortunately, 
these alternative normalizations all lead to the same basic conclusion.  
 
Consider first the size of IMF financing per program (Figure 5, upper left panel). 
There is a steady increase in the median program size and an increase in the 75
th percentile of 
the size distribution. The program with the largest financing also rose from the 1980s, but the 
largest ever program, at 19 percent of GDP, was that for Uruguay in the aftermath of the 
Russian crisis.
47  While peak program size then came down in the European crisis to 15 
percent of GDP for Ireland, this was far above the 3 and 6 percent of GDP levels in the 
commercial debt and the Tequila/Asian crises. When official cofinancing is included (as in 
Figure 5, upper right panel), the rise in the median and 75
th percentile program sizes over 
time is once again evident, with a small dip in the Russian crisis (though Uruguay boosts the 
largest program even in that episode.  
 
The growing size of financing packages is clearest when cumulating multiple 
programs per country in each crisis episode (Figure 5, lower left panel) and considering total 
official financing (Figure 5, lower right panel).  Financing packages rise sharply in size 
between the commercial debt and Tequila/Asian crises mainly because of extensive official 
cofinancing.  Aggregate financing jumps for the largest program in the episode in question, 
from about 10 percent of GDP in the commercial debt crisis to 20 percent of GDP for the 
largest program in the Tequila/Asian crisis (Mexico in 1995).  The further increase in the 
Russian crisis reflects multiple programs (as in the commercial debt crisis). And the latest 
step up in program size in the European crisis arises from both larger IMF financing and the 
substantial co-financing. Over the entire period, the largest cumulative official financing 
package has grown ten-fold.  The program at the 75
th percentile has grown six-fold, and the 





                                                 
46 Increases in quotas take place through regular and ad-hoc reviews. The 14
th General Review of Quotas, once 
it becomes effective, will double quotas to catch up with global economic developments and realign quota 
shares to fast-growing emerging market and developing countries that have become underrepresented. 
47 Access to IMF financing under the arrangement for Uruguay was augmented in June and August 2002, 
bringing it to 19 percent of GDP – we discuss this case at greater length below.  Note that the full amount was 
drawn. Note also that the IMF’s decision-making process does not take into account a country’s nominal GDP.  
48 If there are repeated programs in the European crisis, the observed increase would be even greater.  Among 
the sample countries in the European crisis, only Ukraine and Romania have had successor programs so far. The 
programs for Iceland, Latvia, Greece, Ireland and Portugal are still active at the time of writing, while 
Hungary’s has expired.  16 
 
 
Figure 5: IMF and total official financing   
(in percent of GDP) 
 
Note: The upper panel depicts averages for each crisis of IMF and total official financing per program, 
respectively. The lower panel shows the average cumulative IMF and total official fianncing, respectively, that 











































































Cumulative official financing per country during crisis17 
 
 
The rapid response and large 
financing extended to support the 
Mexican program reflected the Fund’s 
new view of itself as “crisis manager” 
Boughton (2000).   The commercial 
debt crisis emphasized the systemic 
implications of crises, encouraging the 
Fund to focus on containing the crisis 
as a principal objective, rather than 
merely facilitating stabilization and 
structural adjustment in the originating 
country in the hope that this would 
also resolve the broader crisis.   
 
Thus, not only was the 
Mexican program during the Tequila 
crisis larger than its predecessors, but 
the shift toward more official financing proved permanent, though with variations in the 
extent of participation by bilateral and other multilateral lenders varying somewhat over time 
(Figure 7, left panel). This reflected, in part, the new dependence of sovereigns on bond 
rather than on bank financing (Figure 6) and the difficulty then perceived of mobilizing 
bondholders to negotiate a restructuring. It reflected also fears of contagion—that other 
countries would be adversely affected if investors began to fear restructuring-related losses.   
 
 
Figure 7: Official financing  (in percent of GDP), capital flows, and exchange rate pressure 
 
 
Does the increase in program financing reflect the greater severity of crises?  Our 
answer is “yes and no.”
49  The peak-to-trough capital flow reversal was larger in the 
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Tequila/Asian crises than the commercial debt crisis (see Figure 7, right panel), but peak 
exchange market pressure was less.  In the crises following Russia, capital outflows were 
modest.  While peak exchange market pressure was greater than in the Tequila/Asian crises, 
it was again less than in the commercial debt crisis.  By both metrics, then, the Russian crisis 
was less severe than the commercial debt crisis, although the financing was considerably 
larger. The European crisis was characterized by little exchange market pressure but a huge 
capital flow reversal and large financing, as we have seen.   
 
It would appear, ex-post, that the size of the capital flow reversal has been a key 
correlate of the magnitude of official financing.
50 If so, the rise in official financing over time 
primarily reflects the spread of financial globalization and, with it, the scope for capital flow 
reversals.  By this metric, the Russian crisis cases were outliers, where the large financing 
was nevertheless provided, perhaps, because fear of contagion was palpable in the wake of 
preceding events in Asia.  This suggests that, along with the financing needs arising from 
capital flow reversals, perceived risk of contagion has been the other driver of growing 
program size. 
 
These hypotheses can be tested using regression analysis, with total cumulative 
official financing as a share of GDP as the dependent variable.
51  The results, in Table 2, 
show that when all programs are pooled, capital flow reversals appear as the main factor 
associated with program financing size, with little role for the exchange market pressure. 
When episode fixed effects are included, the capital reversal variable remains, which implies 
that even within each episode the extent of capital flow reversals continues to influence 
program financing.
52 The fixed effects suggest that, controlling for capital flow reversals and 
exchange market pressure, program size did not rise between the commercial debt crisis and 
the Tequila/Asian crisis, but there was a jump in program financing in the Russian episode 
and a further modest rise in the European crises. Thus, other crisis-specific factors, such as 









                                                 
50 IMF financing is determined based on a country’s balance of payments need, not on the basis of capital 
reversals. Notably IMF financing cannot substitute for private capital shortfalls in the medium term. This is, 
inter alia, reflected in the IMF’s Exceptional Access Criteria, requiring prospects of gaining or regaining access 
to private capital markets during the period when IMF resources are outstanding.   
51 Not just IMF financial assistance. 
52 These regressions should be taken with the obvious caveats.  In particular, there is the possibility that the 
extent of the capital flow reversal reflects the magnitude, actual or anticipated, of multilateral financial 
assistance.  Here the capital flow reversal is measured between periods t-2 to t (where t is where exchange 
market pressure and/or sovereign spreads spike), whereas program financing becomes available in t or t+1, so 






Table  2: Correlates of official financing 
Variable  Coefficients   Coefficients 




Exchange market pressure index, peak -0.05*  
[-1.78]
-0.02   
[-0.62]
Constant  22.14 ***
[6.08]
 
Commercial debt crisis    10.86
[1.27]
Tequila/Asian crisis dummy   10.53**
[2.49]
Russian crisis dummy    22.25***  
[4.50]
European crisis dummy   31.65 *** 
[7.51]
      
R-squared  0.46 0.73
 
Note: columns report the coefficients in an Ordinary Least Square regression with cumulative official financing 
by country (in percent of GDP) during a crisis episode as dependent variable.  t statistics are in brackets. *** 
represents significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent levels. 
 
We conclude that although crises have come in different flavors, the one predictable 
trend has been a rise in program financing. In retrospect, the rise in program size in the 
second half of the 1990s, during the Tequila and Asian crises arose primarily because there 
was a perceived need to dampen the consequences of large capital reversals. The continued 
growth in program financing through the Russian crisis and its aftermath reflects broader 
systemic considerations, and the European crisis brought these two themes of capital-account 
reversals and systemic risk together.
53 
 
The conditions attached to IMF financial assistance are an important part of the 
official response, insofar as the domestic adjustment required by these conditions can, in 
principle, substitute for program financing.
54 Adjustment can be thought of as (i) 
macroeconomic adjustment through fiscal consolidation, exchange rate devaluation, or 
monetary contraction to fight inflation; this is largely captured through the quantitative 
targets of the IMF programs or (ii) structural reforms, as defined by structural conditionality. 
The scope and use of quantitative macroeconomic targets have remained similar over time, 
although tailored to different exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policy regimes.
55 The 
                                                 
53 Which are tempting to interpret in terms of contagion. 
54 See IMF (2001), IMF (2005), and Independent Evaluation Office (2007) for more comprehensive studies and 
IMF (2009) for a description of recent reforms to modernize IMF conditionality. 
55 Since 1979, all upper credit tranche Fund-supported programs have quantitative performance criteria. The 
arrangements under the Flexible Credit Line and the Precautionary Credit Line that were approved in 2009 have 
ex-ante policy conditionality in the form of qualification criteria. 20 
 
 
macroeconomic programs of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina during the commercial debt crisis 
aimed at reducing budget deficits and public external debt, bringing down inflation by 
containing the growth of monetary aggregates, building reserves, and, later on, eliminating 
external payment arrears as part of the debt strategy. Mexico and Argentina had similar 
program targets during the Tequila crisis, but with substantially larger financing. 
Macroeconomic programs in the Asian crisis focused on restoring confidence, including 
through reconstituting net international reserves, combined with fiscal policies to support the 
external adjustment. The programs for Brazil (in 1999) and Turkey (in 2006) incorporated 
“inflation consultation clauses” tailored to inflation targeting countries. The recent programs 
for European countries have emphasized fiscal targets, especially for euro area countries with 
no national monetary and exchange rate policies.  
   
Trends in the scope of conditions related to structural reforms are harder to identify. 
The only metric of these conditions is their number, which is at best imperfectly correlated 
with the extent of the reforms agreed and completed. Moreover, the degree to which 
structural reforms have been formal conditions, as distinct from informal commitments that 
were nevertheless viewed as part of the overall program, has varied over time. Despite 
increasing awareness of the role of structural policies in the course of the 1980s, there was 
much resistance against linking them to performance criteria.
56 Instead, the understanding 
was that overall progress on structural reforms would be discussed at program reviews.
57   
 
Thus, structural reforms were rarely formal program conditions during the 
commercial and the Tequila crises.
58 Structural conditionality became more of a focus as a 
result of the structural deficiencies unveiled in the Asian crisis. The Asian programs 
incorporated a large number of structural conditions, initially focused on financial sector 
reform. While these lists of reform measures quickly developed into a broader reform 
agenda, they were not part of the program’s formal conditionality but were rather were 
commitments by the authorities (Figure 8). Early programs in the Russian crisis cases had an 
even larger number of conditions.
59  
 
Structural conditionality evoked considerable criticism for being intrusive, 
undermining national ownership, lacking priority, overwhelming implementation capacity, 
and being in areas outside the core expertise of the IMF. In response, initiatives were taken 




                                                 
56 The IMF’s conditionality was constrained by the 1979 Conditionality Guidelines, which stated that 
performance criteria “will normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, and (ii) those necessary to 
implement specific provision of the Article [of Agreement] or policies adopted under them.” 
57 For low-income countries, structural policies occupied a central role in Fund programs starting with the 
Structural Adjustment Facility and later the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in the 1980s. 
58 An exception is Argentina (1984), which had performance criteria on interest rates and making foreign 
exchange available.  
59 Although partly offset by less non-formal structural commitments. 
60 In September 2000, an Interim Guidance Note was issued for this purposed, followed by the Guidelines on 
Conditionality adopted by the IMF Executive Board in 2002. 21 
 
 
Thus, conditionality has been 
streamlined in the most recent set of 
programs. It is more focused on macro 
relevant reforms, the majority of 
measures being related to financial 
sector, the fiscal balance, and 
monetary/exchange rate policies. 
Following the March 2009 overhaul of 
the IMF’s lending framework, 
implementation of structural policies is 
monitored in the context of program 
reviews rather than through the use of 
structural performance criteria, which 
have been discontinued in IMF-supported 
programs. While structural reforms 
continue to be integral to IMF programs, 
countries no longer need formal waivers 
if they fail to implement a structural reform by a particular date. 
 
IV.   PRIVATE SECTOR BURDEN SHARING 
Characterizing trends in private sector burden sharing is not easy.  Doing so 
systematically would require a quantitative assessment of the extent of haircuts, which in turn 
requires the cumulative reduction over multiple bail-in efforts, an analysis that to our 
knowledge has not been undertaken.  
 
That said, overall tendencies are clear (see Table 3 for an overview of private sector 
involvement in the crisis cases in the sample). As we read the evidence, there has been 
declining reliance on private sector burden sharing over time, albeit with significant 
oscillations around that trend. Thus, all the countries centrally involved in the 1980s’ 
commercial debt episode ultimately underwent debt restructuring. Payment relief was seen as 
an alternative and important supplement to official financing in an era when financing 
packages were typically small. Restructuring negotiations, while not always brought to a 
quick conclusion, were ongoing. In contrast, the current European crisis has seen only one 
restructuring proposal as of the time of writing, in Greece, and the estimated prospective 
reduction in the net present value (NPV) of the debt or haircut, at 21 percent, is relatively 
limited by historical standards.
61  In the intervening episodes, the picture is similarly nuanced, 
but there is an overall a tendency for official financing to increase and emphasis on 
restructuring to fall.  
 
How do we explain the trend away from private-sector burden sharing?  We argue 
that burden-sharing agreements have become more difficult with the shift from bank to 
                                                 
61 And even that estimate is controversial (Allen, Eichengreen and Evans 2011). 
Figure 8. Structural conditionality in IMF-supported 
programs 
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securitized finance.  More difficult is not the same as impossible, to be sure, but there are 
more players involved than in the 1980s, when developing country debt was in the hands of 
illiquid loans extended mainly by a handful of money-center banks.  In the case of the recent 
Greek debt restructuring proposal (more on which below), the financial institutions 
represented by the Institute of International Finance agreed to an exchange designed to 
produce a 21 percent reduction in the net present value of the Greek government bonds.  That 
21 percent figure assumed, however, a 90 percent participation rate, and it is not known to 
what extent the banks in question had already sold their Greek government bonds to other 
investors less inclined to participate in the exchange.  An “involuntary” exchange in which 
those other holders were required to accept new bonds in exchange for their own ones, 
through inter alia a change in the Greek law governing the securities in question, would have 
presumably constituted a credit event that would have triggered credit default swaps on the 
debt, with uncertain consequences for the issuers of that insurance. This further illustrates the 
difficulties of arranging burden-sharing agreements in the era of securitized finance.  
 
In addition, the resolution of the debt overhang in the commercial debt crisis required 
the Fund to relax its lending-into-arrears policy, giving itself latitude to lend even when a 
sovereign was in arrears to private creditors. In principle, this strengthened the sovereign 
debtors’ bargaining position and created greater scope for burden sharing with creditors. In 
practice, however, two countervailing tendencies operated. In the commercial debt crisis, 
absent the ability to lend into arrears, the Fund had actively engaged in rolling over and 
restructuring private debt while requiring private financing as a substitute to Fund 
financing.
62 Once lending into arrears became possible, the Fund and other official creditors 
created greater distance between themselves and private creditors while rapidly increasing 
the official financing package.
63 As Panizza et al. (2009) report, this distance reflected greater 
need for impartiality once the lending-into-arrears policy was lifted and the fact that 
substantial financing had made the Fund a major creditor, creating potential conflicts of 
interests. The greater leverage that the debtors had acquired did lead to more unilateral debt 
exchanges in the Russian crisis; however, as Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2006) show, the 
haircuts on these unilateral initiatives were less than through the coordinated process 
previously operative, with the exception of Argentina in 2001-5. Sturzenegger and 
Zettlemeyer (2006, p. 10) conclude that “…international official creditors, led by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), played a more aggressive role in preventing debt 
restructurings in the 1990s than in the 1980s, through large lending packages to countries 
such as Mexico, Brazil, and Turkey. Without these lending packages and the fiscal 
adjustment programs they supported, these countries probably would have had to restructure 
their public debts in the late 1990s.” An IMF staff account of the capital account crises of the 
1990s offers the same assessment. “In contrast to the provision of official financing, attempts 
                                                 
62 Boughton, 2000, p. 286 reports that at a meeting with bankers in mid-November 1982, the Managing Director 
of the Fund informed bankers that “he would recommend to the IMF’s Executive Board that the Fund lend 
Mexico around $3.8 billion over three years, only if received written assurances from the banks within six 
weeks that they would increase their exposure to Mexico by $5 billion.” This initiated the practice of “concerted 
lending,” which “succeeded in filling the financing gap.”  
63 As we have documented. 23 
 
 
at coordinated private sector involvement, broadly construed, were quite limited, particularly 
in the earlier crises….” (Ghosh et al. 2002, p. 16). 
 
These quotations suggest that the present characterization of broad trends in crisis 
resolution, toward more extensive financing and less present value reduction, is not ours 
alone.  That said, this part of our analysis will be particularly controversial.  We therefore 
consider private sector participation in the individual episodes in more detail. 
 
A.   The Commercial Debt Crisis 
The commercial debt crisis eventually led private and official foreign creditors to 
extend substantial debt reduction.  In 1982-83, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil re-negotiated 
debts to their commercial bank creditors, although the resulting settlements were limited to a 
mix of new financing and rescheduling of principal in the short term. When it became clear 
that this was unlikely to be enough, governments and their creditors shifted in 1984 to 
negotiating multi-year rescheduling arrangements with modest net present value reductions 
designed not to do too much damage to bank balance sheets.  As it became apparent once 
again that this would not be enough to jump-start growth and restore creditworthiness in the 
crisis countries, the Baker Plan was introduced in 1985, combining structural reforms with a 
putative commitment by the creditors to provide new financing.   
Unfortunately, neither the resumption of growth nor significant new financing 
materialized.  Brazil responded in 1987 with a unilateral debt moratorium, and it became 
increasingly clear that the commercial banks would have to take more losses.  In 1987-8, 
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil negotiated new debt restructuring agreements, exchanging debt for 
exit bonds with lower face value and engaging in debt buy backs at depressed market prices. 
Finally, in 1989 the Brady Plan was introduced, combining significant NPV reduction with 
collateralization of principal using U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds and reserves placed in 
escrow account to pay interest payments, creating a template through which the debts of a 
range of problem countries were then restructured.  
The IMF played an important role in the Brady deals.  IMF financing was set aside 
for debt reduction operations of the debtor countries to make the deals possible.
64 There was 
                                                 
64 Some of the resources made available under the IMF arrangements were set aside to help the member country 
restructure its commercial debt, and the Fund indicated its readiness to consider an augmentation under certain 
conditions once the borrower had reached a settlement with its commercial bank creditors.  For Mexico, the 
Board approved in May 1989 a three-year extended arrangement for SDR 2.9 billion (240 percent of quota), 30 
percent of which was set aside for debt-reduction operations.  The Board also expressed its readiness “to 
consider a possible request by Mexico for augmentation of the arrangement for up to 40 percent of quota in the 
event that arrangements for the financing of Mexico’s program provide for appropriate debt-service reduction 
and upon determination by the Fund that such arrangements are consistent with objectives of the program and 
with the guidelines on Fund support for debt and debt service reduction operations.” For Argentina, the set-
aside was 25 percent of access in the 1991 arrangements. Another 25 percent of access was set aside at the 
subsequent arrangement in 1992. Brazil initially had similar provisions in its 1992 program (25 percent of total 
access set aside), but the negotiations on the Brady deal with the banks was extended and the program went off 




also a commitment to augment existing programs once the Brady deals became effective.
65  
As noted above, the Fund’s policy of not tolerating sovereign arrears was modified to help 
bring the banks to the negotiating table.  Previously, the banks knew that official credit 
would not be available until a strategy for dealing with arrears was agreed.  This effectively 
gave the banks a veto over IMF arrangements.  In 1989 the Fund therefore modified its 
arrears policy to permit Fund financing to lend into sovereign arrears to private external 
creditors (the so-called lending-into-arrears policy) if two conditions were met. First, prompt 
IMF support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the member 
country’s adjustment program. Second, the member country is pursuing appropriate policies 
and is making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors. The 
new policy would then tolerate accumulation of arrears to commercial banks pending the 
negotiation of voluntary market restructuring agreement.
66  
B.   The Tequila/Asian Crises 
In a departure from this previous approach combining official financing with NPV 
reduction, the Mexican-Tequila crisis was met with unprecedented official financing but no 
NPV reduction.  Official financing was provided to support amortization of the tesobonos 
(short-term sovereign obligations) and to help the commercial banks meet their external 
obligations.  The tesobonos had diverse ownership and lacked well defined legal and 
operational rules for restructuring.  Given the scope for them to roll off as they matured, it 
was considered impossible to coercively retain credit lines from foreign commercial banks, 
since doing so would imply differential treatment of bondholders and banks.  The approach 
succeeded in the end, helped in no small part by the fact that Mexico had milder structural 
problems in 1994 than in its previous crisis.     
Similarly, there was no renegotiation of sovereign debt to private creditors in the 
Asian crisis.
67  Commitments were obtained from international banks to keep open their 
credit lines to the private sector, but foreign creditors did not incur significant NPV losses.
68  
Instead, large financing packages again provided the cover needed to deal with problems that 
proved to be temporary in nature.  The Fund again adopted a more arms-length approach to 
the restructuring process than in Brady-Plan days.  
C.   The Russian Crisis and its Aftermath 
Since macroeconomic imbalances were greater in the Russian crisis and its aftermath, 
resolving them required more time, multiple programs, and greater recourse to debt 
                                                                                                                                                       
commercial banks waived the requirement of having a Fund program.  All this information is from publicly-
available sources. 
65 The implication is that while the bait of additional financing helped bail in private creditors, absent that bail 
in, the size of official financing needed would have been even greater. 
66 This policy was extended from commercial banks to all private creditors in 1998.  See IMF (1989) and IMF 
(1998).  
67 Indonesia rescheduled debt with Paris Club creditors during 1998-2000. Another small rescheduling of 
sovereign bond maturities occurred in 2000 during a successor program. 
68 However, comprehensive strategies for bank and corporate restructuring were implemented under the Asian 
crisis programs. 25 
 
 
restructuring.  While creditors incurred NPV losses, the IMF again maintained an arms-
length posture toward restructuring negotiations, the relevant documents limiting themselves 
to describing the requirements for debt sustainability and emphasizing the voluntary nature of 
the debt exchanges.
69   
An exceptional case in the aftermath of the Russian crisis was Uruguay, which 
combined an unprecedented level of financing with a voluntary debt exchange.  The Uruguay 
program started out large (at 6 percent of GDP) and was then was augmented twice in June-
August 2002 amidst deposit outflows and reserve losses (as a result of which it reached 19 
percent of GDP, an enormous number by IMF standards).   
While the program did not call on Uruguay to restructure, it referred to “daunting 
challenges” to debt sustainability, difficulties in meeting debt service obligations, and the 
need to engage in dialogue with market participants.
70  The Fund left the design of the 
exchange to the authorities and their advisers while providing assurances that financing gaps 
would be addressed.  The resulting deal extended the average maturity of virtually all market 
debt by about five years while maintaining the low interest rates contracted when Uruguay 
had enjoyed investment grade ratings.  A high participation on the part of creditors 
(93 percent) led to a successful debt exchange, which helped reduce short-term financing 
needs while reducing the debt burden by about 5 percent of GDP.
71 
Why was Uruguay able to integrate debt restructuring into its crisis resolution plans at 
a relatively early stage?  One answer is that there was not much concern about contagion, 
reflecting the country’s small size.  Another is that the actual extent of the restructuring, in 
terms of NPV reduction, was modest. In this sense, particularly given the size of its official 
financing package, Uruguay is not a notable exception to the general trend we have been 
describing. 
D.   Europe 
Private sector involvement in the current European crisis was initially limited to 
foreign creditors’ exposure to commercial banks.  At the time of writing, only in Iceland and, 
to a lesser extent Ireland and Greece, have foreign bank creditors had to accept haircuts on 
their bonds.  In Eastern Europe, foreign parent banks have committed to rolling over their 
interbank credit lines and maintain capital adequacy in their subsidiaries, including in 
Hungary, Latvia, and Romania, through the European Bank Coordination Initiative.
  The 
European Bank Coordination Initiative (formerly the Vienna Initiative) created in 2009 
helped ensure that foreign banks remain engaged and that overall commitments remain 
intact. The group brings together the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
                                                 
69 A few cases required official debt restructuring through the Paris Club and had an associated standard 
requirement of “comparability of treatment” to private creditors. 
70 The phrase in quotes is from the staff report for the Augmentation and the First Review of the Stand-By 
Arrangement (August 2002), as published. 
71  This combination of substantial official financing and limited NPV reduction was successful in the sense that 
the debt/GDP ratio then fell quickly as growth resumed and the government ran substantial primary surpluses 
(averaging 3.4 percent of GDP in 2003-07). 26 
 
 
Development, the European Investment Bank, the World Bank Group, EU institutions 
(European Commission with the ECB as observer), home and host country central banks, 
regulatory and fiscal authorities as well as the largest western banking groups active in 
emerging Europe.
72 
In the summer of 2011, the European Union agreed that further financial assistance 
for the Greek government should be combined with private-sector involvement in the form of 
a commitment by foreign banks to roll over a portion of their holdings of Greek debt as it 
matured.  There was, however, a reluctance to contemplate significant net present value 
reductions in principal and interest, consistent with our characterization of broad secular 
trends.   
Finally, in July 2011 a proposal by the Institute of International Finance (representing 
banks holding Greek debt) on a menu-based approach to restructuring the sovereign’s debt 
was endorsed by the European Commission.  That proposal, which is now to be negotiated 
between the Greek authorities and the creditors, envisages a nominal 21 percent reduction in 
the net present value of the bonds, as noted above, and this is to be achieved by the exchange 
of 90 percent of the government’s outstanding bonds into three new securities: a “par” bond 
with a 30 year maturity and an average interest rate of 4.5 percent, and a pair of “discount” 
bonds, with 15 and 30 year durations and interest rates of, respectively, 5.9 and (roughly) 6.5 
percent. The proposal was combined with an EU commitment to improve the terms of its 
financial assistance to Greece, as well as additional fiscal adjustment efforts by the Greek 
government.  
Whether this represents a break with the broad trend away from substantial private-
sector burden sharing only time will tell.  What is already clear from this Greek tragedy, 
however, is that policy makers continue to resist and delay the decision to turn to debt 
restructuring – as they again did in this recent case. 
     
V.   A NEW APPROACH 
Debt restructuring has up-front political and economic costs but deferred benefits.  
Politicians with finite political lives and higher discount rates than society as a whole may 
therefore be reluctant to contemplate it or put it off excessively.  There is a reluctance to 
proceed in the hope that good news that removes the need may miraculously turn up.  Fears 
of contagion are also very real in the midst of a crisis.  
 
                                                 
72 Outside the European crisis, there are two recent precedents of debt exchanges within Fund programs. In 
Jamaica, the February 2010 debt exchange on domestic debt (including foreign-currency-denominated debt) 
was a prior action for the approval of the standby arrangement. A large amount of IMF financing was provided 
upfront to finance a fund for financial institutions holding the government debt. In Seychelles, the December 
2008 program was based on a comprehensive restructuring of sovereign debt to private and official creditors. 
But these programs are relatively small by today’s standards (300 and 200 percent of quota, respectively) and 
the countries in question are not systemic. 27 
 
 
In recognition of this fact, a series of efforts has sought to encourage institutional and 
contractual innovations designed to modestly tip the balance toward earlier restructuring and 
making the restructuring process more efficient.  Earlier schemes for an international-
bankruptcy-court-type mechanism to determine the need for a restructuring and cram down 
terms culminated in Krueger’s (2001) Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism proposal.
73  
Responding to international pressure, over 90 per cent of bonds issued by emerging markets 
in recent years have included collective action clauses in an effort to signal that, if things 
went wrong, restructuring those debts would be easier (Gulati and Gelpern 2009).  Similarly, 
European leaders have agreed that collective action clauses should be included in all new 




There are reasons to skeptical of this approach.  It is difficult to make politically-
difficult decisions while a crisis is ongoing (as emphasized in Eichengreen, Kletzer and 
Mody 2001).  And if there is sufficiently strong political resistance to proceeding with a 
“potentially disruptive” restructuring, adding collective-action clauses will not be enough to 
tip the balance.  There will always be incentives to take extraordinary action to avoid having 
to invoke them. 
 
  One way of addressing this would be for future bond covenants to include 
provisions that trigger restructurings automatically.  These would be “sovereign cocos,” 
contingent debt securities that automatically convert in the event of pre-specified debt-
sustainability problems.  The idea is that if adequate incentive to restructure is not present 
once a crisis starts, it should be built in ex ante. 
 
The concept is taken from the debate over bank reform, where there is a similar 
problem of bail-ins and bail-outs.  Because of the difficulty of putting banks through a 
bankruptcy-like procedure, which among other things can create difficulties for bank 
counterparties, there is an incentive, analogous to that which arises in the context of 
sovereign debt, to provide a bailout and hope that good news will turn up rather than 
proceeding with the delicate process of bailing in the bondholders.  Contingent convertible 
bonds (cocos) have been suggested as a solution to this problem.  When Tier 1 capital falls 
below a pre-specified limit, the bonds in question automatically convert to equity, bailing in 
the bondholders and helping to recapitalize the bank.
75   
 
                                                 
73 A comprehensive survey of proposals for an international bankruptcy-type mechanism is Rogoff and 
Zettelmeyer (2002) provide a comprehensive survey of proposals for an international-bankruptcy-type 
mechanism. 
74 The quotation is from Eurogroup (2010). 
75 This is similar in some respects to a proposal from the German government (Weber, Ulbricht and Wendorff 
2011) that new euro-area bonds be required to include a contractual provision providing for a three-year 
maturity extension at the volition of the European Stability Mechanism when the latter provides an emergency 
loan for the government of a member state.  The two differences from our proposal is that Weber et al. consider 
maturity extension only and that the provision would not be automatically when a pre-specified debt threshold 
was reached; rather, it would be at the volition of the ESM. 28 
 
 
There has been some progress in issuing these instruments.  In 2010 Lloyds Banking 
Group Plc exchanged some of its subordinated bonds for enhanced capital notes that become 
equity if the lender’s core Tier 1 ratio falls below 5 per cent of assets.  Rabobank Groep NV 
sold senior notes that will be written down to a quarter of their face value if its capital ratio 
slips below 7 per cent.
76  Credit Suisse issued more than $2 billion of cocos in February 2011.  
At the time of writing other banks (the Bank of Cyprus, for example) have indicated their 
intention to follow. 
 
Extending this idea to the sovereign-debt domain, government bond contracts could 
provide that if a sovereign’s debt/GDP ratio exceeds a specified threshold, there will be an 
automatic reduction in principal and interest payments when the trigger is reached.
77  One 
could also imagine making the trigger a function of the debt service/government revenue 
ratio, or of a convex combination of these two ratios.
78   
 
This approach also has the specific advantage that activation of this contractual 
provision would not constitute a “credit event” that would trigger credit default swaps (CDS) 
written on the government debt instruments in question.  The existence of large quantities of 
CDS in the market, together with uncertainty about precisely which financial institutions are 
responsible for issuing them, has fed the reluctance to proceed with restructuring (reluctance 
grounded in a fear of creating “an AIG-like event”).  This specific obstacle to restructuring 
the obligations of a borderline-insolvent sovereign would be relaxed by the introduction of 
instruments with these provisions into the market. 
 
 Objections to this idea are obvious – starting with whether sovereigns would have an 
incentive to include such provisions in their bond contracts and whether, even if an 
international agreement was reached to mandate their inclusion, the incentive would be to 
place the threshold so high as to render it meaningless. 
 
Concretely there is the objection that this kind of provision would increase 
sovereigns’ borrowing costs, since investors would be wary of being bailed in and require 
compensation.  In strong form, the argument would be that investors would be unwilling to 
hold such securities at any price.  Note, however, that while the same argument has been 
made about bank cocos, adequately capitalized banks have not found it difficult to find 
willing buyers of such instruments.  This is evident from the example of Credit Suisse in 
February 2011, when its issue of cocos was favorably priced and 11 times oversubscribed.
79  
                                                 
76 The experience with banks’ cocos thus suggests that the threshold specified in the bond contract can be 
specific to the issuer—and, indeed, if there are multiple issues, the threshold will likely be specific to the issue.  
We return to this below. 
77 More modestly there could be an automatic extension of maturities, although it is hard to see how maturity 
extension alone would address the sources of policy bias noted above or be appropriate if breaching a specified 
debt-GDP ratio is taken as prima facie evidence of unsustainability 
78 Specific triggers could be tailored to country circumstances.  As with collective action clauses (and bank 
cocos, for that matter), there is no reason why different countries with different characteristics should have to 
adopt a one-size-fits-all provision. 
79 The rating agency Standard & Poor’s estimates that banks will raise about a trillion dollars in contingent 




Moreover, there is reason to think that borrowing costs would not rise across the 
board.  They would only rise for sovereigns whose debts were within hailing distance of the 
trigger.  Empirical work on collective-action clauses shows that their inclusion in bond 
covenants increases borrowing costs for risky sovereigns with potential sustainability 
problems and not for others far from the “strike price” (Eichengreen and Mody 2004).
80  It 
seems plausible that the pattern would carry over.   
 
That borrowing costs would rise for risky borrowers as the trigger is approached is by 
no means undesirable.  Experience suggests that credit spreads do not always widen 
gradually as debt burdens grow; rather, investors tend to remain sanguine for extended 
periods before awakening abruptly to the existence of sustainability problems.  If coco-like 
clauses serve to focus the attention of investors, adding them to bond covenants might 
enhance the regularity of market discipline.   
 
Another objection to cocos is uncertainty about the trigger: in the case of commercial 
banks, regulators in different countries value Tier 1 capital in different ways, making it 
difficult for investors to assess when conversion might be triggered.   There might be similar 
uncertainty about how to value and what to count as debt and about the level of GDP.  To 
address these concerns, bond covenants could specify that the trigger would be based on debt 
statistics constructed by an independent party.  Candidates would be rating agencies, 
Eurostat, and the IMF, and the regional development banks, which publish such numbers as 
part of their normal reporting but are not parties to the agreement.  To further reduce the risk 
of reporting bias, the agreement could specify the trigger as the higher or lower of two 
independent estimates.
81   
 
As with the Tier 1 capital ratio, data on sovereign debt ratios are published by these 




For banks, the academic literature has also suggested an equity price as the trigger 
(Flannery, 2009). Concerns have been expressed about this idea, however. Bondholders may 
                                                 
80 For other countries with low debts and impeccably good credit, where the provision can be seen simply as an 
insurance policy against exogenous risks (a Japan-like earthquake, for example), it can be argued, in parallel 
with the results for CACs, that they might end up able to borrow more.  These responses should presumably be 
taken into account when setting trigger levels ex ante (see below). 
81 The efforts of Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical agency, to construct comprehensive estimates of the 
debts of the member states suggest that this task will not be intractable.  But the problems it has experienced in 
constructing tractable estimates for, inter alia, Greece suggests that neither will it be easy.  
82 Many of the same points arise in the context of GDP-indexed bonds: the possibility that GDP statistics might 
be manipulated, the difficulties of pricing, and the illiquidity of the IPO market.  However, where in the case of 
GDP-indexed bonds it is presumably obvious in which direction a government would seek to manipulate the 
statistics – it would want to understate growth in order to reduce its debt burden – the direction in which an 
issuer of sovereign cocos would wish to manipulate the statistics is less clear.  While understating GDP would 
get it a maturity extension, in practice governments actively seek to avoid having to restructure, and such 
governments would wish to overstate GDP. Our suggestions for addressing the problem of data manipulation 
might usefully be taken up by issuers of GDP-indexed bonds and sovereign cocos alike.   30 
 
 
have an incentive to drive down the price to the threshold level and thereby gain preemptive 
access to the bank’s stock at a “cheap” price (Sunderesan and Wang, 2010). Because of this 
possibility, there may be multiple equilibria in the stock price (Pennacchi et al 2010).  For 
sovereign cocos, the corresponding trigger would be the sovereign bond spread over a proxy 
for the risk-free rate. The spread is then a measure of the risk of default, and the restructuring 
trigger could be a value of the spread above which a mandatory restructuring occurs.  
Concerns about manipulation would arise also in this case.  Authorities could “talk up” the 
spread by irresponsible statements, especially as it nears the threshold.  Equally, large 
investors might seek to drive down the price of debt.  Again, the risk would occur closer to 
the threshold where gains from such strategies are realistic.  One partial solution to this 
problem might be for the contract to institute a “cooling off” period, by requiring the spread 
to persist above the threshold for some months before the trigger event is established.
83 
 
A further objection is the argument that triggering a country’s sovereign cocos would 
prevent the government from issuing new bonds with similar provisions to fund itself.  
Assuming as seems plausible that the government in question had gone into the episode 
running large deficits, the country would therefore experience a draconian compression of 
public spending and a sharp recession.  Absent official support, this is likely to be correct.  
Even through triggering these provisions on outstanding bonds will have reduced the 
country’s debt/income ratio, possibly substantially, re-accessing financial markets is likely to 
also require a multi-quarter or multi-year process of reestablishing policy credibility.
84  But 
this problem of market access in the immediate aftermath of a restructuring holds for all 
restructurings, to a greater or lesser extent, whether the restructuring is automatic or 
discretionary.  Limited amounts of official finance may thus be called for to help bridge the 
gap.   
 
Then there is the danger of contagion if a government’s cocos are triggered.  There 
could be negative spillovers to banks and other institutional investors at home and abroad 
that hold the government bonds in question.  There could be negative spillovers, both via the 
banking system and direct confidence channels, to bond markets in other countries.   
 
But is there reason to think that the risks of contagion will be greater than under 
prevailing contractual arrangements?  Working in the other direction is the argument that if a 
predictable process of debt restructuring is in place, as in our proposal, the risk of contagion 
will be lower since all parties will be forewarned of its imminence and will, therefore, have 
adequate time to prepare. Even in instances of sharp changes in market sentiment, triggering 
default and restructuring, the market would have a well-defined probabilistic basis for 
anticipating the event in contrast to the current fuzziness on this matter that tends to create 
sharp swings in market sentiment. 
 
                                                 
83 Haldane (2011) considers these concerns about the consequences of market speculative behavior and suggests 
similar safeguards. He concludes, “So while CoCos are susceptible to market aberrations, these can in my view 
be managed.” 
84 Although experience in previous crises (viz. Argentina) suggests that the necessary period of reputation 
rebuilding may be shorter than sometimes supposed. 31 
 
 
A key issue will be setting the conversion trigger.  The trigger needs to be placed high 
enough that it is unlikely to be reached as the result of a garden-variety recession but low 
enough that it kicks in when serious issues of debt sustainability arise.  It is unlikely that the 
same debt-to-GDP ratio will be appropriate for different countries with different growth 
rates, real interest rates, and revenue-raising capacities.  In other words, attempts to 
incorporate workable provisions of this sort into sovereign bond covenants would confront 
policy makers with all the same analytical problems of standard debt sustainability exercises 
– which is not to say that they should be relieved of trying to solve them.   
 
That said, there is no reason why the trigger could not be set at different levels in 
different countries.  The Tier 1 capital threshold for bank cocos is set at different levels (see 
above).  The thresholds for bondholder participation specified in collective action clauses 
differ across countries (Eichengreen 2003, Gulati and Gelpern 2009).  The same could be 
true for sovereign cocos, in other words.  Similarly, the specified degree of restructuring 
would be different—from maturity extension to outright write downs. 
 
As in the case of collective action clauses, there is likely to be a first-mover problem.  
There will be fears by potential first movers of sending adverse signals about their 
creditworthiness.  The first mover would pay a novelty and liquidity premium.  This creates 
arguments for countries to move together through coordinated multilateral action.    
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
  Our review of the modern history of financial crises highlights the heterogeneity of 
experience—to paraphrase Anna Karenina, every unhappy crisis is unhappy in its own way.  
But it has also revealed some common trends.  The violence of financial reversals has tended 
to grow, mirroring the progress of financial liberalization such as it is and the growth of 
international capital movements.  One consequence has been that the financial requirements 
of international intervention have increased.  
 
  An explanation for this last trend is the absence of viable alternatives. Private lenders 
have an obvious interest in holding out for full payment, whether directly from the sovereign 
or indirectly through resources provided by international financial institutions.  National 
officials have an interest in pushing into the future a difficult and politically embarrassing 
restructuring in the hope that good news will somehow turn up.  Multilaterals find it hard to 
go against the wishes of those national officials and, being risk averse, fear restructuring as 
one of those “unknown unknowns.”  Recognizing that restructuring is difficult during a 
crisis, private investors have an incentive to lend at rates that are, in retrospect, too low.  This 
implies that the next crisis has a larger capital outflow, increasing the size of the official 
financing needed to limit the damage. 
 
We have therefore explored ways of automating the restructuring decision as a way of 
countering this bias.  Automating the process has key advantages: it preserves the integrity of 
the contract (which avoids the uncertainties involved in triggering CDS); it is predictable; 
and it can be priced.  To this end, we explore the idea of adding to future government bond 
issues so-called sovereign cocos, contractual provisions that automatically lengthen 32 
 
 
maturities or reduce interest and amortization payments when a pre-specified debt/GDP ratio 
is reached.   
 
At this point, sovereign cocos are an idea in search of a proposal.  Adding them to 
future bond issues will require solving difficult technical issues.  It would also require 
solving coordination problems—getting governments to move together.  But, equally, not 
addressing the occurrence of ever-larger crises due to large inflows and subsequent large 
outflows of underpriced international capital is a story that cannot end well. 33 
 
 
Table 3: Private Sector Involvement and Debt Restructuring in IMF Programs 
   
Private Sector Involvement 
  Sovereign Debt 1/   
IMF program        Default 
2/ 
Restructuring   
Commercial debt crisis 
Mexico    Repeated rescheduling of debt 
with commercial banks, 
combined with assurances to 
provide new money. Also 
concerted rollover of interbank 
credit lines. One of the first Brady 
agreements to be finalized, in 
1990, leading to substantial debt 
reduction. 
 Aug.82  Eight  restructuring 
agreements with 
commercial and Paris 
Club creditors during 
1983-89, followed by a 
Brady deal in April 
1990. 
 Jan.83  –  Dec.85 
Nov.86 – Apr.88 
May.89 – May.93 
Argentina    Bridge loan with private creditors 
to eliminate arrears, and unilateral 
rescheduling of domestic loans in 
1982. Unsuccessful negotiations 
of rescheduling commercial loans 
during 1983-84, then agreement 
on official package combined 
with rescheduling/new money 
from commercial creditors in 
1985, but new arrears appeared. 
Brady agreement in 1993, 
including down-payment of 
overdue amounts by Argentina. 
 Sep.82  Six  restructuring 
agreements with 
commercial and Paris 
Club creditors during 
1985-92, followed by a 
Brady deal in July 
1993. 
 Jan.83  –  Jan.84 
Dec. 84- Jun. 86 
Jul 87- Sep.88 
Nov.89- Mar.91 
Jul. 91 – Mar. 92 
Mar.92-Mar. 96 
Brazil    In 1983, agreement with 
commercial banks to rollover 
short-term financing into 
medium-term financing, and 
provide new money through 
syndicated loans. Delays in 
completing multi-year 
rescheduling agreements and 
unilateral stop in interest 
payments on bank debt in 
February 1987, followed by new 
restructuring agreements. Final 
Brady agreement in 1994, re-
establishing orderly relations with 
creditors. 
 Jan.83  Nine  restructuring 
agreements with 
commercial and Paris 
Club creditors during 
1983-89, followed by a 
Brady deal in April 
1994. 
  Mar.83 – Feb.86 
Aug.88 – Feb.90 
Jan. 92- Aug. 93 
Tequila crisis 
Mexico           Feb.95  –  Feb.97 
Argentina           Mar.92  –  Mar.96 
Apr.96 – Jan.98 
Asian crisis 
Thailand    Japanese banks gave informal 
assurances that credit lines to 
Thai banks would be maintained. 
      Aug.97  –  Jun.00 
Indonesia    Agreement in 1998 with foreign 
banks to reschedule interbank 
  Mar.99  Two Paris Club 
rescheduling 
  Nov.97 – Aug.98 
Aug.98 – Feb.00 34 
 
 






principal payments in 
1999-2000. 
Korea   Agreement  with  foreign 
commercial banks to convert 
short-term of loans to Korean 
banks into longer-maturity 
sovereign-guaranteed bonds. 
      Dec.97  –  Dec..00 
 
Philippines           Jun.94  –  Mar.98   
Apr.98 – Dec.00 
Russian crisis and aftermath 
Russia    Restructuring of treasury bills, 
bonds, and commercial bank 
loans, with NPV reduction. 
Foreign investors’ claims on 
Russian banks were settled in 
bilateral negotiations.  
 Aug.98  Three  restructuring 
operations of debt with 
commercial creditors 
during 1997-2000, and 
a Paris Club 
rescheduling in 1999. 
Final London Club 
restructuring with 
commercial creditors in 
August 2000. 
  Mar.96 – Mar.99   
Jul.99 – Dec.00 
Brazil    Monitoring of foreign banks’ 
credit lines to banks operating in 
Brazil and indications of 
commitments to maintain or 
rebuild exposures (1999). 
Joint statement of long-term 
commitment and intention to 
maintain exposure to banks 
operating in Brazil at meetings 
with leading banks in 2002. 
      Dec.98  –  Sep.01   
Sep.01 – Sep.02 
Sep.02 – Mar.05  
Argentina    The June 2001 megaswap 
increased the debt stock 
marginally, but the Phase 1 
restructuring in November 
implied an NPV reduction. The 
2005 global debt exchange led to 
a large NPV reduction.  
Repeated intervention in bank 
balance sheet led to losses for 
banks’ creditors.  
  Nov.01  Two rounds of debt 
treatment in 2001, prior 
to default. In April 
2005, a global bond 
exchange was offered. 
Rescheduling of official 
bilateral debt has not 
been completed. 
 Feb.98-Mar.00 
Mar.00 – Jan.03  
Jan.03 – Aug.03 
Sep.03 – Jan.06 
Uruguay    Sovereign debt exchange with 
NPV reduction in 2003. Creditors 
of commercial banks also haircut. 
  May.03  A single global bond 
exchange in May 2003. 
  Apr.02 – Mar.05 
Jun.05 – Dec.06 
Turkey    General commitment in 2000 by 
foreign commercial banks to 
maintain exposure to Turkish 
banks, monitored weekly. 
Voluntary domestic debt swap to 
lengthen maturities in June 2001. 
Voluntary agreement in 2002 
with foreign banks to maintain 
      Dec.99  –  Feb.02 
Feb.02 – Feb.05 
May.05 – May.08 35 
 
 
exposure to Turkish banks and 
companies.  
European crisis 
Ukraine           Nov.08  –  Nov.10 
Jul.10 – Dec.12 
Hungary    Foreign banks agreed to maintain 
exposure to their subsidiaries in 
Hungary. 
      Nov.08  –  Oct.10 
Iceland    Losses imposed/agreed with 
creditors of failed Icelandic 
banks. 
      Nov.08  –  Aug.11 
Latvia    Foreign banks agreed to maintain 
exposure to their subsidiaries in 
Latvia.  
      Dec.08  –  Dec.11 
Romania    Foreign banks agreed to maintain 
exposure to their subsidiaries in 
Romania. 
      May.09  –  May.11 
Greece        Voluntary  program  of 
debt exchange and a 
buyback plan for Greek 
government debt 
  May.10 – May.13 
Ireland    Haircuts on subordinated debt of 
government-guaranteed Irish 
banks. 
      Dec.10  –  Dec.13 
Portugal           May.11 – May.14
            
1/ Includes operations on sovereign bonds, commercial and official loans. 
2/ A default is defined in the month in which the government misses its first payment beyond the grace period or there is a 
public announcement to restructure a sovereign debt instrument. Prior to 1995, default is based on IMF staff reports. From 
1995 onward, the classification of sovereign default by credit rating agencies is applied, using the default month provided by 
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